The June 16, 1999 Federal Register described the Seaport Security Commission Study and requested industry comments on the study effort. Accordingly, the following official comments were prepared from ICSC-wide input and forwarded to the Commission on August 13, 1999.

1. Enlarge the scope of the port study area. The scope of the commission's study is too narrow. A review of port security should look at our ports as major components of a larger intermodal transportation system. Experience of the ICSC has shown that criminals clearly understand the boundaries of security responsibility in ports and are preying on cargo shipments outside the port areas. There is no doubt that seaports have traditionally been known as high risk theft areas, but one can not analyze seaport security without also considering the entire intermodal process. In all aspects of the study, the risk is equally high, perhaps higher, for terrorism, cargo crime (both import and export), narcotics, internal conspiracies, etc., outside the seaports themselves. The common denominators are the cargo and the ports. Modern supply chain management requires full intermodal integration and possession of the cargo outside ocean carrier/port direct control where experience has clearly demonstrated repeated criminal activity.

2. Port personnel identification. The commission should issue guidelines for identification standards for the various parties normally in port areas or handling cargo, i.e. port labor and management, truckers, carrier personnel, etc. Standardization of identification criteria would facilitate port implementation of systems to positively identify parties authorized to handle cargo in all ports.

3. Blueprint the cargo release process. A model should be developed acceptable to law enforcement, Customs and the industry, which articulates secure cargo delivery processes, documentation, EDI exchange, etc. This model would serve as a national standardized blueprint for ports to follow in coordinating release processes between all parties for the movement/delivery/receipt of cargo and minimize the potential for fraudulent delivery.

4. Recommended improvements on cargo laws. New laws specifically addressing cargo crime are needed. An attempt was made recently in the unsuccessful 1998 Lautenberg Bill (S1512) which sought to increase sentencing guidelines; to create cargo crime as a category in the Uniform Crime Reports; to establish a national database that law enforcement could use to assess degrees and trends of cargo crime; and to fund cargo crime task forces. There is still a strong need for such legislation. While the private sector continues to pursue this, we feel it is essential for the commission to vigorously support these critical issues in their report.

5. Cargo theft data and information system. A national database for effectively and efficiently reporting cargo crime is absolutely critical. No effective nationwide system exists today. The absence of such a nationwide system for collecting data and information on cargo theft is a serious handicap to law enforcement. The ICSC believes it is equally essential that such a database be managed and operated by law enforcement in order to protect the integrity of the information and the commercial interests of the parties reporting. One of the major deterrents inhibiting reports of losses is Customs' practice of penalizing the victim who has reported a theft, i.e., the carrier. Customs' policy in this regard must be changed.

6. Cargo theft task forces. As has been demonstrated in South Florida, the only viable way to ensure successful coordination and cooperation among federal, state and local agencies against cargo crime is to fund multi-disciplinary task forces. Cargo theft task forces are the single most effective means we have to combat cargo crime. Funding for these task forces must come from the federal government, possibly augmented by state/locals. The key factors in ensuring successful task force operations are to provide adequate dedicated resources and to maintain day-to-day interaction and multi-year continuity. This will allow for long term undercover activities and penetration into organized crime and smuggling operations.

7. Involvement with the private sector. A major component of any effort to combat seaport related crime must be to have full involvement of and partnership with the private sector. The International Cargo Security Council, DOT's Volpe Center and others have vast experience in this area and are ready to share this experience with the commission.

8. Cargo crime training for law enforcement. Law enforcement needs to learn more about the unique commercial aspects of seaport/cargo operations and security. They should attend training seminars for appropriate personnel to learn how the cargo transportation business is actually conducted, what information sources are available, the specific commercial considerations, etc. Maersk Line and the ICSC/US Merchant Marine Academy have developed and are presenting such training courses. The commission should make use of the extensive private sector expertise available to develop and support such cargo theft seminars for law enforcement and regulatory officials.